18.06.2026

Rot at the heart

Erdoğan’s blatant intervention in the internal affairs of the main opposition party is all part of a master plan to ensure him a third presidential term. Meanwhile, lacking a principled programme, the left is reduced to tailism. Esen Uslu reports

A Reddit reader asks: “Can someone explain what’s happening with CHP [Republican People’s Party]?” Among the many replies, one simple answer stands out: “Business as usual in a non-democratic country.”

This simple and plain truth is difficult for the various groups on the Turkish left to comprehend. With their trust in their own or other leftwing groups’ ability to initiate and sustain independent action on behalf of working people as a whole having been undermined, they tend to cling to the centre-left CHP in an attempt to present a semblance of opposition to president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his coalition.

A distinguishing feature of these leftwing movements is their lack of a clear political programme. This hinders their ability to comprehend the existing contradictions within society and causes them to turn a blind eye to the realities.

A hodgepodge of pre-1980 coup slogans, mixed with the slogans of new mass movements against ‘neoliberalism’, constitutes the new ‘platform’ for much of the leftwing opposition. When they are unwilling to address the pressing issue of democracy, such as the Kurdish question (or only address it superficially with the age-old slogan of ‘the right of nations to self-determination’ without combatting deeply rooted Turkish nationalism), many on the left are willing to regard the CHP as a unifying force and therefore participate in its internal struggles.

The problem has many historical aspects. In smaller cities and towns, the weak leftwing opposition could only gain ground when working with the CHP. As young leftists are more militant and ready to be mobilised, CHP organisations assumed that they would either leave (or be ejected) after a few years, as they would be unable to stand the hypocrisy, or be absorbed into the mainstream CHP and lose their leftwing ideas. From one election period to the next, a part of the Turkish left disappears into the mainstream CHP. They drag along a larger segment of leftwing workers with them.

Neighbourhoods

In the principal cities, the situation is somewhat different. Here, there are districts and neighbourhoods that inherently oppose the regime. For example, Alevi communities that have settled in former city slums have become more mainstream, as gentrification continues. However, they still suffer from the Islamist-nationalist pressure exerted by the state authorities. In the past, these areas were hotbeds of revolutionary activity. Now, the new generation has lost interest in politics and regards any attempt to overthrow the regime as a hopeless pipe dream. They stay well clear of political opposition as a result. Therefore popular discontent is mainly expressed through the CHP’s opposition to the regime. Left organisations that have alienated their grassroots support have been unable to resist the pressure and have joined the bandwagon.

The situation in the Kurdish areas of the main cities is somewhat different. The Kurdish freedom movement has the upper hand in those areas, but is unable to convince the Turkish left to adopt its policies. There is still a discrepancy between the leadership of the founder of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, who is still imprisoned, and local organisations, meaning their approach to the left is neither smooth nor consistent. Furthermore, nationalism in the guise of anti-imperialism remains a significant feature of many leftwing organisations and poses a major obstacle.

The ‘peace process’, or the ‘terror-free Turkey process’, as it is called by the Erdoğan regime, has created yet another layer of difficulty. Initially, the new CHP leadership did not join the parliamentary group visiting the island prison of İmralı to meet Öcalan face‑to‑face.

The CHP decided to participate in the parliamentary ‘Commission on National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy’. However, its distrust of the coalition between the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) led it to adopt a neutral position on the outcome. For example, the CHP did not use the commission as a platform to press for the removal of central government-appointed managers instead of elected mayors from the Kurdish freedom movement and those elected on the CHP ticket.

While these factors are pushing and pulling the various leftwing tendencies towards the CHP, the regime is determined to break the CHP’s backbone in order to paralyse the entire opposition and thereby secure one more presidential term for Erdoğan and his coalition.

A couple of years ago, Erdoğan instructed the judiciary to “shake the municipalities until the rotten fruit falls off”. The CHP had, note, become Erdoğan’s main electoral challenger after winning Turkey’s 2024 local elections and retaining control of İstanbul, Ankara and other major cities.

The appointment of hand-picked ‘yes men’ in accordance with the mandatory retirement or promotion timings of various judicial and prosecutorial positions were carried out carefully. Eventually, they were ready to deliver the coup de main.

The 2023 CHP congress and any subsequent congresses were deemed unlawful, as were the leaders elected at those congresses. CHP chair, Özgür Özel, thereby found himself ousted and former leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, was reinstated by an Ankara appeals court ruling. Kılıçdaroğlu proceeded to take control of the CHP’s disciplinary machinery, change the party’s website, sack headquarters staff and take steps that distanced CHP from jailed İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu (he was, for example, removed from the new CHP website). İmamoğlu is, of course, a CHP member and is Erdoğan’s strongest potential rival when it comes to presidential elections.

Full cooperation

Obviously the Erdoğan regime needed the full cooperation of Kılıçdaroğlu. As the old Turkish saying goes, ‘When a tree is getting rotten, the worms are deep inside’. The former party leadership was willing and conniving enough to play the role assigned to them by the Erdoğan regime. Kılıçdaroğlu and his CHP has, it should be noted, resumed official contact with Erdoğan’s AKP (broken because of the arrest of İmamoğlu and other CHP mayors).

Özgür Özel and his CHP - which reportedly has the majority of the party’s MPs and mayors - is determined to put up a strong fight. However, recent events have shown that, while a good proportion of the party base supports the old, democratically elected leadership, a substantial section of office holders are procrastinating and adopting a middle of the road position, in an attempt to persuade both sides to avoid splitting the party, which would ruin its electoral chances.

Many on the Turkish left sensed the possibility of a split and therefore proposed the formation of a new party. The ousted leadership has been openly appealing to leftwing organisations such as the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP). TİP leaders were elected to parliament on the Kurdish freedom movement ticket in the last elections. While Öcalan considered them to be part of the broad movement he was planning to bring together to further the peace process, and had sent them an invitation to that effect, the leader of the TİP, Erkan Baş, gave an interview with T24 in which he claimed that the TİP might not be able to support a candidate whose “native language” was Kurdish! While Baş later ‘clarified’ his remarks, it is clear that TİP is hedging its bets. It wants to keep the option of continued cooperation with the pro-Kurdish DEM open, but it might find cooperation, even unity, with an Özel CHP split more appealing.

While the main parliamentary opposition party is in disarray, having two leaders with varying degrees of support among the rank and file, as well as a growing indecisive centre, the AKP is gathering ‘ripened’ parliamentarians from the ‘shaken’ CHP and the other parliamentary parties into its fold in an attempt to increase its number of seats. The numbers are crucial for changing the constitution, as well as supporting Erdoğan’s third-term candidacy.

The judiciary appointed by Erdoğan, ignoring the constitution and laws, is tightening the screws every day, with a new ‘anti-corruption operation’ - detaining more and more mayors, elected municipal officers and public employees of municipalities. The harassment has spread to their spouses and even their extended family members. These unjust detentions and baseless court cases are keeping many influential CHP members in jail, while the newly appointed CHP leadership is talking about ‘cleansing the party of corruption’.

The raison d’état subtly expressed in the speeches of the leader of the MHP reflects the needs of the USA and its allies in Turkey and the Middle East during these turbulent times. Thomas J Barrack, the US envoy to Turkey, Syria and Iraq, is busy ‘ironing out problems’. The Kurdish region of Iraq is unable to function as a parliamentary structure without US intervention. The al-Sharaa regime installed in Syria has proven a difficult ally. While Iran is a handful, nobody wants to shake the seemingly stable foundations of Turkey.

The European Union is considering imposing sanctions on the new minister of justice, Akın Gürlek, appointed by Erdoğan in February 2026, over his role in the sham trials. But apart from Spain there has been no strong opposition to the shenanigans in Turkey.

Next month’s Nato summit in Ankara will, in effect, be a tacit endorsement of the Erdoğan regime, and may provide the impetus needed to split the main opposition party and detain its rebel leaders. We shall see.